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Abstract. This paper is in the area of pseudonym-based enhancements
of user identity privacy in mobile networks. Khan and Mitchell (2017)
have found that in recently published pseudonym-based schemes an at-
tacker can desynchronize the pseudonyms’ state in the user equipment
and in its home network. In this paper, we first show that by exploit-
ing this vulnerability a botnet of mobile devices can kick out of service a
large portion of the users of a mobile network. We characterize this novel
DDoS attack analytically and confirm our analysis using a simulation.
Second, we explain how to modify the pseudonym-based schemes in or-
der to mitigate the DDoS attack. The proposed solution is simpler than
that in Khan and Mitchell (2017). We also discuss aspects of pseudonym
usage in mobile network from charging and regulatory point of view.
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1 Introduction
International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers are threats to the iden-
tity privacy of mobile users. Passive IMSI catchers are devices that observe the
wireless traffic and store all the IMSIs observed. Active IMSI catchers are mali-
cious devices that can trick a user equipment (UE) to reveal its IMSI. Protection
against passive IMSI catchers has been in the cellular networks since the sec-
ond generation (GSM). However, active IMSI catchers have persisted in all the
existing cellular networks, namely, GSM, UMTS and LTE [1,2,3,4,5,6].
An active IMSI catcher impersonates a legitimate serving network (SN) and
asks for the identity of all the UEs in its range. The UEs have no way to dif-
ferentiate an IMSI catcher from a legitimate SN, hence reveal their IMSIs as if
they were revealing to a legitimate SN.
A potentially simple and backward compatible solution approach is to use
frequently-changing temporary identities for mobile users [7,8,3,9,10]. The idea is
that, if a UE communicates with an active IMSI catcher, it reveals only its tem-
porary identity. This prevents the IMSI catcher from associating the temporary
identity with any user who is previously known. The temporary identities are
called pseudonyms. Hence solutions using this approach are called pseudonym
based solutions.
Borek, Verdult, and Ruiter [7] and Khan and Mitchell [8] described pseudonym
based solutions where the pseudonyms have the same format as IMSIs. From now
on we will refer these two schemes as BVR and KM15 schemes. As shown by
Khan and Mitchell in [11], these solutions are prone to the loss of synchroniza-
tion between the pseudonyms in the UE and the home network (HN) of the user.
In the worst case, the synchronization is completely lost and there is not even
one common pseudonym left in the UE and the HN. Hence all identification and
authentication attempts will fail thereafter and the UE will go out of the service.
There is a vulnerability in these solutions that can be exploited by an attacker
to cause the loss of pseudonym synchronization. The attacker can be a malicious
UE or a malicious SN.
In addition to identifying the above vulnerability, Khan and Mitchel [11]
also proposed a solution. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to this solution
as the KM17 scheme. Careful investigation into this scheme shows that a UE
has to use one pseudonym at least twice before it can get a new pseudonym
from the network. The authors also argue that their solution may be vulnerable
to a pseudonym de-synchronization attack by a malicious SN. To address the
issue of malicious SNs, they introduce an identity recovery procedure. But, this
procedure adds complexity: the number of temporary identities per user increases
from two to six. Moreover, as we will later explain, the recovery mechanism itself
can be exploited by an IMSI catcher to track the mobile user.
Our Contribution: We propose a pseudonym based solution that builds
on top of the BVR, KM15 and KM17 schemes. The following contributions are
made:
1. Identify a DDoS attack against an entire HN when the BVR scheme is used.
2. Design a simpler (than KM17) solution that corrects the identified weak-
nesses of the pseudonym based schemes (KM15, KM17 and others)
3. Outline some practical concerns of using pseudonyms from billing and regu-
latory point of view.
2 Preliminaries
Conceptually, a cellular network can be divided into UE, the HN where the
mobile user has a subscription, and the SN that is the network to which mobile
device connects. The SN and HN are the same when the UE is not roaming. An
SN or HN consist of many entities. In this paper we will not discuss those fine
details. However, we need to know some details about the UE. A UE consists of
two entities: a mobile equipment (ME) and a subscriber identity module (SIM).
The SIM is known as universal subscriber module (USIM) in UMTS. Both SIM
and USIM are smart cards which are portable across different MEs. In LTE, the
USIM is an application in the universal integrated circuit card (UICC). In this
paper, we will refer all of them as SIM for the sake of simplicity.
A user is identified by IMSI. IMSI is a string of 15 decimal digits. An IMSI is a
concatenation of mobile country code (MCC), mobile network code (MNC) and
mobile subscription identification number (MSIN). MCC is a string of 3 decimal
digits. MNC is either 2 or 3 decimal digits and MSIN is 9 or 10. Pseudonyms
discussed in this paper are strings of 15 decimal digits and thus are indistin-
guishable from IMSIs. In this paper we limit our discussion to only one HN.
Consequently, all the IMSIs or pseudonyms we discuss have the same MCC and
MNC. When we talk about the IMSI space or the pseudonym space, we actually
mean the MSIN space. We denote the size of this space by M and it is either
109 or 1010. We will also use n to denote the total number of users subscribed
with the HN.
In the cellular networks, the security is built on a pre-shared master key
K between a user and its HN. The key K is stored in the SIM along with the
IMSI. The HN maintains a map from IMSI to key K for all the users. The
authentication mechanism used by an SN to authenticate a user is based on
challenge and response. The key K is only known by the HN. Hence, the HN
delegates the SN by sending the challenge and expected response. Pseudonyms
are assigned to a user during the authentication. This requires certain changes in
the authentication protocol. In UMTS and LTE, the authentication protocols are
called UMTS AKA and LTE AKA respectively. Before we discuss the pseudonym
based solutions, we present UMTS AKA and LTE AKA briefly.
2.1 UMTS/LTE AKA
We discuss UMTS and LTE AKA only very briefly in order to provide the
required background. Details of UMTS AKA can be found in Clause 6.3 of
3GPP TS 33.102 [12] and LTE AKA can be found in Clause 6 of 3GPP TS
33.401 [13].
The UE identifies itself by sending the IMSI to the SN within an attach
request or a response to an IMSI inquiry. Upon receiving the IMSI, the SN sends
an authentication vector (AV) request to the HN for the IMSI. The HN finds
the pre-shared key K, randomly generates a challenge (RAND) and computes
the expected response (XRES), as well as two keys CK and IK as functions of
K and RAND. The HN also computes a string called AUTN for the purpose
of some cryptographic protections of the authentication protocol. HN forwards
RAND,AUTN,XRES,CK, IK to the SN that forwards the RAND,AUTN
to the UE. The UE verifies the AUTN , computes SRES,CK, IK using the
RAND and key K and forwards SRES to the SN. If SRES and XRES are the
same strings, then the authentication is successful. The keys CK and IK are
used for confidentiality and integrity protection thereafter. See Figure 1.
In LTE, upon receiving the AV request, the HN also computes another key
KASME . Contrary to UMTS, the HN forwards RAND,AUTN,XRES,KASME
to the SN. The UE verifies the AUTN , computes SRES,CK, IK,KASME using
the RAND and key K and forwards SRES to the SN. If SRES and XRES
are the same strings, then the authentication is successful. The key KASME is
Fig. 1: UMTS/LTE AKA
used to generate further keys for confidentiality and integrity protection. See
Figure 1.
2.2 Location Update
3GPP TS 23.012 (Section 3.6.1.1) [14] specifies that, when a UE registers with
a visitor location register (VLR), an entity in the SN, the VLR provides its
address to the home location register (HLR), an entity in the HN. When a UE
uses an IMSI/pseudonym for the first time, it is considered as a registration in
the SN and, consequently the HN is informed with the address of the SN for the
IMSI/pseudonym. We will refer to this location update (LU) message sent for
IMSI/pseudonym x as LUx in this paper. We will use these LU messages in our
solution.
3 Related Work
The BVR and KM15 schemes describe how pseudonyms can be introduced in the
legacy networks. Also other proposals [3,9,10] were published in 2016 and 2017.
All these proposals use essentially the same idea of using frequently changing
pseudonyms recognized by the HN. The vulnerability identified in [11] is present
in all these solutions. We will explain the DDoS attack and our solution in the
context of the BVR scheme, nevertheless the principle of the attack applies to
all existing pseudonym based solutions.
3.1 BVR Scheme
Along with the shared secret K, every user shares another secret key κ with
the HN. The SIM inside the UE stores two pseudonyms at any point of time,
(PMSI, Pnew). The SIM uses Pnew the next time the UE receives an IMSI
inquiry and keeps using Pnew until it receives a new pseudonym. The HN also
stores two pseudonyms (p, p′) for every user at any point of time. In an ideal
situation, PMSI = p and Pnew = p′.
The HN sends the next pseudonym encrypted by the key κ as a part of the
random challenge RAND used in AKA. Upon the successful completion of the
AKA between the SN and the UE, the next pseudonym can be decrypted by the
SIM. The BVR scheme builds on top of the UMTS/LTE AKA. Figure 2 shows
the required changes. BOX A and BOX B in the figure refer to those operations
in the same boxes in Figure 1.
Fig. 2: The BVR Scheme
Whenever an AV request arrives for p′, the HN forgets p. Forgetting an
old pseudonym is important so that it can be reused. However, forgetting a
pseudonym before being confirmed that p′ has been received by the UE is a
vulnerability as pointed in [11]. If a malicious UE identifies itself using a ran-
dom pseudonym and if, by chance, the random pseudonym is associated with a
legitimate UE, then the HN forgets an old pseudonym of this legitimate UE. In
Section 4 we will show how this vulnerability can be exploited into a fatal DDoS
attack.
3.2 KM17 Scheme
The KM17 scheme uses three pseudonyms at the HN end: ppast, pcurrent and
pfuture. It also uses three recovery identities (RID) : RIDpast, RIDcurrent and
RIDfuture. The LUpfuture message sent by an SN to an HN after registration of
pfuture is considered as the confirmation that pfuture, RIDfuture have been de-
livered to the UE. Upon receiving LUpfuture , the HN forgets ppast and RIDpast by
setting ppast ← pcurrent, pcurrent ← pfuture, pfuture ← null and after some other
verifications sets RIDpast ← RIDcurrent, pcurrent ← RIDfuture, RIDfuture ←
null. The HN always sends pfuture as the next pseudonym embedded in the AV.
If pfuture is null, it generates a new one from the pool of unused pseudonyms.
Careful investigation of the KM17 scheme shows that a pseudonym has to
be used at least twice before the UE can get a new pseudonym from the HN.
The HN forgets ppast only when LUpfuture arrives at HN. LUpfuture would arrive
only if pfuture was used by the UE already at least once. Notice that pcurrent
that arrives after LUpfuture is the same as pfuture before LUpfuture arrived. After
the arrival of LUpfuture , pfuture has become null. So, at this point, to get a new
pseudonym, the UE has to use pcurrent. Consequently, our claim follows. The
use of the same pseudonym twice happens because the scheme does not forget
ppast when LUpcurrent arrives. We take care of this issue in our solution.
The authors argue that the scheme is vulnerable to a malicious SN who
tries to attack by sending fake LU messages. As a reactive measure, the authors
propose a recovery process that enables a UE and the HN to get back in a syn-
chronized state of pseudonyms. The recovery process uses a temporary recovery
identity (RID). The HN sends the RIDfuture as a part of the RAND in a sim-
ilar way a pseudonym is sent. When a UE gets convinced that the pseudonym
synchronization has been lost, the UE sends the RID piggybacked in the reject
message AUTS. Based on the RID, the process can recover to a synchronized
pseudonym state. Detail of the process can be found in [11]. However, an IMSI
catcher can convince a UE that the synchronization has been lost and learn the
RID of the UE. After learning the RID, the IMSI catcher can track the user
using this RID. This is a severe problem because preventing such tracing is the
reason for the use of pseudonyms in the first place.
However, one might argue that the RIDs can be changed as frequently as
the pseudonyms. Note that forgetting an old RID is also triggered by the same
LUpfuture that triggers forgetting an old pseudonym. Consequently, synchroniza-
tion of RIDs becomes as vulnerable as synchronization of pseudonyms, when a
malicious SN sends fake LU messages. In the analysis of our solution in Section 6,
we will show that a malicious SN can be detected very quickly and stopped before
it can mount a meaningful attack.
4 Attack On BVR Scheme
The attack is mounted by a malicious UE. The attack has two phases.
Phase 1 Amalicious UE sends an attach request using a random pseudonym
q1 to a legitimate SN. The legitimate SN sends an AV request for q1 to the HN.
If by chance, q1 = p′ for a user s, the HN forgets p and sets p← p′. The HN also
generates an unused pseudonym p′′ and sets p′ ← p′′ . As a result, in the HN,
the current pseudonym state for the user s is (p = Pnew, p′ /∈ {PMSI, Pnew}).
Phase 2 The malicious UE sends another attach request using a random
pseudonym q2 to a legitimate SN. The legitimate SN sends an AV request for q2
to the HN. If again by chance, q2 = p′, then the HN again forgets p, sets p← p′.
HN also generates an unused pseudonym p′′′ and sets p′ ← p′′′. Consequently,
the current pseudonym state of the user s is {PMSI, Pnew} ∩ {p, p′} = ∅; i.e.
the user s and the HN become completely unsynchronized.
The next time the user would need to authenticate itself to a network, the
authentication will fail and, hence, the user will be denied of any service. In
this attack, it is assumed that the UE has not obtained a new pseudonym via a
legitimate SN while the attack was mounted.
4.1 The DDoS Attack Against the BVR Scheme
The DDoS attack is mounted by a botnet of mobile devices. The mobile bots
send many attach requests using different pseudonyms to legitimate SNs. The
legitimate SNs in turn send AV requests for those pseudonyms to the HN. Let
us assume that the total number of pseudonyms sent to the HN is a large integer
m. In this case, a user s will be affected by the attack if there exists two integers
0 < x < y ≤ m such that qx is equal to p′ and qy is equal to the new p′ that is
set after qx = p′ was sent.
We have considered two different ways to mount this attack. In one way, the
pseudonyms used in the attach requests are chosen randomly with replacement,
which means the attack might sent one pseudonym more than once to the HN.
In the other way, the pseudonyms are chosen without replacement.
With Replacement: In this case, after sending m pseudonyms to the HN,
the expected portion of affected users E[ua] is
E
[
ua
]
= 1−
(
1− 1M
)m
−m
(
1
M
)(
1− 1M
)(m−1)
(1)
See the derivation in Appendix A. We have verified the accuracy of the above
model via a simulation, see Figure 3.
Without Replacement: In this case the attacker runs two rounds of the
attack. In the first round the attacker sends all the pseudonyms in the IMSI
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space without replacement, meaning that each pseudonym is sent exactly once.
Once the first round is completed, the attacker runs the attack for one more
round. After sending m pseudonyms to the HN, the expected portion of affected
users E[ua] is
E
[
ua
]
=
{
m2
2·M2 if 0 < m ≤M
1
M (2m−M− m
2
2M ) ifM < m ≤ 2M
(2)
See the derivation in Appendix B. We have verified the accuracy of the above
model via a simulation, see Figure 3. Note that this is an estimation where the
without-replacement attack is not a distributed attack. Rather the attack is
mounted by only a single malicious UE. In the case of distributed and without
replacement attack, the expected percentage of affected users will be less than
what is shown in the plot unless the malicious UEs are very well synchronized.
However, we believe that, a distributed without replacement attack will have
a higher number of affected users than that of a distributed with replacement
attack.
4.2 How Fatal is The DDoS Attack In Practice
The intensity of the attack will depend on the size of the botnet and the number
of pseudonyms send by one bot in a unit time. We name these parameters as
botnetsize and botload respectively. According to [15], the EPS AKA has the
latency of 550 milliseconds. So, the peak value of botload can safely be considered
as 1 pseudonyms/second, i.e., 3600 pseudonyms/hour.
Mobile botnets are on the rise [16,17,18]. Many mobile botnets have already
been observed, e.g., Geinimi [19], Zeus [20], AnserverBot [21], and DreamDroid
[22]. A detailed survey of the state of mobile botnets can be found in [23]. In
2011, it was estimated that Dreamdroid was installed on 120,000 mobile devices
[22]. In 2014, a mobile botnet of 650,000 mobile phones made an attack to a
server [24]. It would not be surprising if we see a mobile botnet consisting tens
of millions of mobile bots in the near future. However, for the discussion in this
paper, we conservatively set the variable botnetsize = 1 million (106). Figure 4,
shows how efficient a botnet of size 106 can be for varied values of botload.
This is a severe threat because threat because all the affected users will be
locked out of the network permanently. The only way an affected user can come
back in the network is to visit a shop delegated by the HN.
5 Our Solution
In the HN, for a user s, our solution stores the IMSI i and three pseudonyms
p, p′, p′′. In the SIM of the user s, two pseudonyms PSMI, Pnew are stored.
In an ideal situation PMSI = p, Pnew = p′. We build our solution on top of
the BVR and KM17 scheme. The pseudonyms p, p′, p′′ can be compared with
ppast, pcurrent, pfuture of KM17 scheme. However, unlike KM17 scheme, our so-
lution uses LUp′ to forget p. Let us assume that for a user s an AV request
has arrived using the pseudonym p and the HN has responded with an AV by
embedding p′ in the RAND. When an LU for pseudonym p arrives, the HN
considers it as a guarantee that pseudonym p′ has been delivered to the UE of
user s. Figure 5 presents our solution. The bold texts present the changes over
UMTS/LTE AKA. BOX A and BOX B in the figure refer to those operations
in the same boxes in Figure 1.
At HN side Whenever an AV request is received for a user s, using any
of its identity, i.e., i, p, p′ or p′′, the HN responds with an AV that contains the
pseudonym p′′ in the RAND. If p′′ is null then an unused pseudonym is chosen
and set as p′′. When p′′ is not null and LU message LUp′ or LUp′′ arrives, the HN
forgets p by setting p← p′, p′ ← p′′ and p′′ ← null.
At UE side During the AKA, if MAC and SEQN verification is suc-
cessful, then the UE sends SRES to the SN. Then the UE verifies if uSEQN is
the same as XSEQN (see Figure 5). If this verification is also successful and
up′′ /∈ {PMSI, Pnew}, then the UE sets PMSI ← Pnew and Pnew ← up′′ . After
a successful AKA, the old pseudonym PMSI will still be used (in place of per-
manent identity IMSI) by the current SN, for example, in paging messages and
in subsequent communications between the HN and the SN. The identity Pnew
comes into play in the next SN.
However, it is upon the freedom of the UE to identify itself either with PMSI
or Pnew in an attach request or in response to an IMSI inquiry. If the consequent
AKA fails many times after identifying with PMSI, the UE would identify itself
using Pnew.
Fig. 5: Solution
6 Analysis of Our Solution
LU messages may be delayed, lost, or sent multiple times. Also in practice,
the LU messages LUp, LUp′ , LUp′′ might arrive in different order because of the
inherent characteristics of IP networks. A malicious or faulty SN might send an
LU message even when the corresponding AKA was failed or maybe not even run.
To understand how our solution behaves in these unusual but possible situations,
we analyze different categories of states a user s can be in the HN or the UE.
We do this analysis based on the relevant variables and eventually construct a
global state diagram of our solution. Based on the global state diagram, we show
how our solution behaves in different situations.
6.1 State Diagrams
We divide all the possible states of a user s in the HN in two categories based on
whether p
′′
is null or not. Based on these two categories, we draw a state diagram
as presented in Figure 6 (right side). The notation used below is explained in
the lower part of Figure 6. Note that our solution is not sensitive to LUi and LUp.
Consequently, only LUp′ and LUp′′ are shown in the diagram.
On the other hand, the UE has only one kind of states as shown in Fig-
ure 6 (left side). It always has two pseudonyms PMSI, Pnew. However, PMSI
and Pnew may have different values. The values of PMSI, Pnew may change
only when a successful AKA happens. For a user s, we have excluded the pos-
sibility of AKA(x, y) where x /∈ {PMSI, Pnew} because the UE will receive a
wrong RAND in that case. We also have excluded the possibility of AKA(x, y)
where y /∈ {p, p′, p′′}. The reason for this exclusion is discussed in detail later.
According to our solution, the UE does not do anything when AKA(x, y) hap-
pens where y ∈ {PMSI, Pnew}. However, even if AKA(PMSI, y) happens where
y /∈ {PMSI, Pnew}, the UE does not forget PMSI because PMSI would still
be used by the SN, e.g., in paging messages. Consequently, only AKA(Pnew, y)
where y /∈ {PMSI, Pnew} is shown in the diagram.
Next we merge the state diagrams of HN and UE into a global state diagram
of our solution (Figure 7). The state of the user’s pseudonyms in the system can
be described by whether PMSI and Pnew on the UE side are one of p, p′, p′′ or
not, and by whether in the HN p′′ has been allocated for user s or not. Based on
this description, there can be 4 ·4 ·2 = 32 pseudonym-states for a user. However,
many of the states are never reachable. For example, it can never happen that
PMSI and Pnew in the UE are the same because a UE forgets PMSI only if
the new pseudonym p′′ is not in the set {PMSI, Pnew}. All the inputs that can
cause a transition from one state to another in the state diagrams of HN and UE
can also cause a transition from one state to another in the global state diagram
(Figure 7).
In our solution, it is assumed that the initial state of a user in the system
is PMSI = p, Pnew = p′ on the UE side, and p′′ has been allocated in the HN.
Taking into account the possible transitions, we have found out that only 10
out of 32 possible states are reachable from this initial state. Those 10 states are
illustrated in Figure 7. Note that neither the UE nor the HN has the knowledge in
which state a user s is in the global diagram. All a UE knows are two pseudonyms
PMSI, Pnew and the HN knows three pseudonyms p, p′, p′′.
For the limitation of space, we are not going to discuss all the states. Never-
theless, to assist the readers in understanding the diagram, let us take a closer
look in a few transitions. Let us consider that the user is currently at State 1.
Since, p′′ is already allocated, AVR has no impact on this state. Consequently,
we do not mention AVR in this state. Since p′′ is allocated, it is possible that
AKA(Pnew, p′′) may run. If either one of these two AKAs happen, the UE for-
gets PMSI. Such an AKA run has no impact in HN until it receives the corre-
sponding LU. Hence, the user moves to State 2 in the solution diagram where
PMSI = p′, Pnew = p′′, p′′ 6= null. However, while at State 1, if either one of
the LU messages LUp′ , LUp′ arrives in the HN, the HN forgets p. Hence, the user
goes to State 4 in the diagram where PMSI /∈ {p, p′, p′′} , Pnew = p, p′′ = null.
The AV request AVR can cause a transition only when p′′ = null, e.g., State 4.
Observe that the pseudonyms in UE and HN are (i) synchronized in states
1-3; (ii) partially unsynchronized in states 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9; (iii) completely
unsynchronized in states 6 and 10, without any possibility of automatic recovery.
Fig. 6: State diagrams of UE and HN
Fig. 7: Global state diagram of our solution for a user s ∈ S.
6.2 Properties of Our solution
Behavior of our solution in unusual but possible cases If an AV request is
responded by the HN but the corresponding AKA is failed or not even run, then
the UE keep using the pseudonyms PMSI or Pnew in the upcoming AKA runs
until an AKA succeeds. This can happen in global states 1, 5 or 9 (Figure 7),
and in this situation the global state will remain the same.
If an AKA becomes successful but the corresponding LU message is not sent
to the HN then the UE will not be able to get any new pseudonym in the
successive AKA runs. This can happen in global states 2 or 7 (Figure 7).
If the PMSI goes out of synchronization (because of e.g., some internal
errors), then the consequent AKA, where the UE is identified by PMSI will
fail. However, in this case AKA(Pnew, y) may still run where y /∈ {PMSI, Pnew}.
Consequently, the UE forgets PMSI and gets back to synchronization.
If the Pnew goes out of synchronization (because of e.g., some internal errors),
then the consequent AKA, where the UE is identified by Pnew will fail. However,
in this case AKA(PMSI, y) still may run. Since the UE does not forget PMSI
after such an AKA, the UE does not update Pnew even if y /∈ {PMSI, Pnew}.
Consequently, the UE will not be able to receive any new pseudonym at all.
However, a pseudonym (PMSI or Pnew) going out of synchronization because
of some internal errors is an extremely rare event and can be compared with the
case of a corrupted SIM. A user can always go to the service center of the HN
and get a new SIM. Another remedy of this problem can be to maintain a list of
three pseudonyms at the UE end instead of two, i.e., when AKA(PMSI, y), y /∈
{PMSI, Pnew} happens, the UE would store y as the third pseudonym even
though it would not forget PMSI. We have not analyzed exhaustively what
happens when such a third pseudonym is introduced in the solution and that
can be considered as a future work.
LU messages can arrive out of order. Receiving LUp′′ before receiving LUp′
means the UE could not get a new pseudonym when it identified itself using p′′
and ran the consequent AKA.
Receiving the LU messages multiple times for the same pseudonym may lead
to the unsynchronized states 6 or 10 (Figure 7). However, as will be discussed
later in this section, the probability of this is small.
Protection Against IMSI Catchers The pseudonyms are delivered to the
UE encrypted by the pre-shared symmetric key κ. Therefore, nobody except the
UE can know the next pseudonym the UE will use. Hence an attacker, either
active or passive, can not link a pseudonym with a previously known identity.
In an ideal situation a UE uses one pseudonym in one successful AKA (notice
the transitions State 1 → State 2 → State 3 → State 1 in Figure 7), which is
unlike the KM17 scheme. In KM17 scheme, the UE has to use one pseudonym in
two successful AKAs before it can obtain a new pseudonym (see our argument
in Section 3.2). One pseudonym for one successful AKA essentially prevents
an attacker from tracking a UE any longer than the attacker can track a UE
using the TMSI or GUTI. However, the MCC and MNC part of the pseudonyms
remains the same across all the pseudonyms used by a UE. Consequently, if there
are k many users with the same MCC and MNC in the geographical area of the
UE, then our solution (similar to BVR and KM17) provides k anonymity of the
user. Note that in a roaming situation k may be quite small.
Backward Compatibility The solution does not require any changes in
the legacy SNs since no existing message format has been changed. The only
changes are required in the HN and the SIM. Hence, once an HN implements
the solution, any user having the upgraded SIM can enjoy the claimed identity
privacy. The solution is still operable if the SIM is not updated even after the
HN has implemented the solution. This is because, in our solution, the HN keeps
accepting the AV requests using the real IMSIs. The effect is that the UE will not
be able to extract the new pseudonyms from the RAND. Otherwise everything
else remains same and operable.
Our solution builds on top of UMTS/LTE AKA without introducing any
new messages or changes in any existing messages. Hence, solution provides the
claimed privacy in the presence of SNs from UMTS and LTE networks too.
A legacy SN may fetch multiple AVs from the HN for a single pseudonym
x. Since AKA(x, y) where x = PMSI does not trigger any pseudonym update,
let us consider the cases where x = Pnew, i.e., AKA(Pnew, y). In such cases, if
y /∈ {PMSI, Pnew} then the UE forgets PMSI and Pnew becomes the new
PMSI. Consequently, if the SN uses the pre-fetched AVs thereafter, it would
be the AKA(PMSI, y) cases – this has no impact on the pseudonym states of
a user. Hence, our solution works smoothly even when an SN uses pre-fetched
AVs for a pseudonym x unless some other user in the same SN is assigned with
pseudonym x. Let us assume a user s1 receives a new pseudonym x from the
HN and sets Pnew ← x. Then user s1 uses Pnew = x in an SN where the
SN already has a pre-fetched AV for the pseudonym x associated with user s2
(forgotten by both HN and UE of s2). In this case, user s1’s AKA will fail.
However, this is also very unlikely to happen. If it happens, the user s1 can still
run AKA(PMSI, y). However, such AKAs will not enable the UE to receive a
new pseudonym. One remedy of this problem can be that the UE may trigger
an SQN resynchronization process if an AKA fails after identifying using Pnew.
By triggering such an SQN resynchronization process, the UE may force the SN
to get a fresh AV from the HN.
Protection Against the DDos Attack: The DDoS attack is mounted
by a botnet of mobile devices. The objective of the attack is to bring as many
mobile users as possible to State 6 of Figure 7. However, any path in the state
diagram (Figure 7) that leads to State 6 involves at least one LU message. An
SN will send an LU message for a pseudonym only if the corresponding AKA
was successful. A mobile bot can not participate in a successful AKA with an
SN using an arbitrary pseudonym. Hence, the attack does not work without an
SN helping the botnet to do so.
Protection Against a Malicious or Faulty SN: In principle, a malicious
SN can still attack the HN by sending a fake LU message for pseudonyms p′, p′′
that are associated with legitimate users. The target of the attacker would be to
send a user to state 6 of the state diagram in Figure 7. We will show that the
probability of success for such an attack is very low before the attack is detected
and stopped. Besides an SN is in a roaming contract (a business contract) with
an HN. The minimal harm the SN can cause to the HN before the attack is
detected and stopped is not worth of risking the renewal of the contract.
Notice that all paths that lead to State 6 in Figure 7 go via State 4. Let us
assume that all the users of the HN are currently in State 1 or 9. This is a safe
assumption because otherwise the attack would be even less likely to succeed.
The malicious SN has to send fake LUp′ or LUp′′ to reach State 4. This implies
that the malicious SN needs to know either p′ or p′′ of a legitimate user s. The
attack can be analyzed for two different situations. In the first situation, the
target users are currently not visiting the malicious SN whereas in the second
situation, the target users are visiting.
Target Users are not Visiting the Malicious SN: The malicious SN can try to
mount a DoS attack against an HN targeting the users who are not even visiting
the SN. In that case, the malicious SN guesses q = p′′ and send a LU for q to
the SN. This brings the user to State 4. Then, the malicious SN sends an AV
request to the HN using q. This brings the user to State 5. Then, the SN sends
another LU for q. This time the user goes to State 6. So, the attack is basically
a sequence of an LU message, an AV request, and another LU message using
the same guessed pseudonym q. Let us consider that the SN starts from 0 and
choose incrementally all the possible pseudonyms across the whole space and
send the three messages to the HN using the chosen pseudonym q. In that way
after sending m triplets of messages to the HN, the expected number of affected
users would be nmM .
Target Users are Visiting the Malicious SN: If the target users are currently
visiting the malicious SN, it is easy to know the users’ p′ because the UE gives
it to the SN. The malicious SN makes IMSI inquiries to all the UEs and hope
that most of the UEs will respond with Pnew = p′. Then, the malicious SN
sends LU messages for all the pseudonyms received as the response of the IMSI
inquiries. This brings many of the users to State 4. Once at State 4, the malicious
SN can send an AV request to the HN using p′ which will take the user from
State 4 to State 5. However, once at State 5, neither the UE nor the malicious SN
knows p′, p′′. So, to reach to State 6, the malicious SN has to guess one of p′, p′′
exhaustively. Suppose it starts from 0 and incrementally choose all the possible
pseudonyms across the pseudonym space and sends LU messages for the chosen
pseudonyms to the HN. By doing so, after sending m LU messages to the HN,
the expected number of users that will reach State 6 is at most 2rmM , where r is
the number of users currently visiting the malicious SN.
To summarize, a malicious SN can attack the users of an HN by sending
LU messages to the HN with randomly chosen pseudonyms. But the HN can
detect and counter the above attack: In order to desynchronize at least one user
of the HN on the average, the malicious SN has to send more than m ≥ M/n
LU messages with randomly chosen pseudonyms. (Remember that n is the total
number of users having the same MCC, MNC in the HN, and M is the size
of MSIN space, which we assume is 1010.) For example, if n = 108, then the
number of those messages should be at least 1010/108, i.e. 100; and if n = 106,
then the number of those messages should be at least 104.
The malicious SN has a large, 1 − n/M chance to guess the pseudonym
wrongly in any given LU message. This results in an LU for a pseudonym not
belonging to any users of the HN. Even a few such messages should make the
HN realize that there is a de-synchronization attack. The HN could then apply
countermeasures. For example, in the short term, the HN could temporarily
suspend processing any LU messages coming from the SN. This will make the
UEs who are visiting the malicious SN more easy to track for the duration of
suspension (because they will have to use the same pseudonym), but on the other
hand, it will prevent de-synchronization of their pseudonyms. In the long term,
the HN may choose not to renew the roaming agreement with the operator of
the SN.
Protection Against Replay Attack by an SN: A malicious SN may
store an AV that it received from the HN with an intention to use it later in
an AKA with a UE. If the SN could do so, then a UE can be tricked to accept
an old pseudonym which is already forgotten at the HN. However, an SN can
not do that. The pseudonyms that are sent to the UEs are encrypted. No one
including the SN knows the pseudonym before it is used by a UE. Consequently,
the malicious SN would know a valid AV for a UE identified by the pseudonym
p only if the AV was obtained from the HN by making an AV request using the
same pseudonym p. The next pseudonym embedded in such an AV can not be
forgotten by either the UE or the HN. Hence a malicious SN can not make a
replay attack to a targeted UE. However, the malicious SN can use a stored AV
to run AKA with all the UEs who are visiting the SN. In that case one user may
get affected if the SQN in the AV is still fresh. This may imply that the valid
range of SQN has to be small when the UE is roaming.
Charging and LI: The HN has to keep track of the pseudonyms used by
a particular user over time. This is needed, first, in order to bill the (right)
user. Since the bills are typically settled once per month, the pseudonym usage
records have to be retained for at least one month. Second, this is required for
lawful surveillance of telecom traffic. The retention period of the records may be
different in different countries but, in general, it will be longer than one month.
For example, the European Union’s Data Retention Directive [25] requires to
store call related data for a period of time between six and 24 months. The
need of law enforcement agencies to know in real time the true identity of the
mobile user can be met by the HN sending that identity to the SN during the
connection establishment. However, handling of this identity would be a new
feature in a legacy SN. When deploying pseudonym-based enhancements to user
identity privacy, some parts in the SN may have to be upgraded to meet law
enforcement needs.
Performance Overhead: A random choice of the next pseudonym, and
the encryption of the pseudonyms are the additional overheads in generating
an AV. This overhead is small. The retention of the history of pseudonyms is
also an additional overhead but does not impact the generation of AVs. In the
SIM it adds one extra key and one decryption using the key. The SNs would see
more users registering in the network because when a UE forgets a pseudonym,
it does not inform that to the SN. However, even legacy SNs are familiar with
cases where a UE suddenly powers off, and a UE forgetting an old pseudonym
would be treated as the UE has powered off.
Parameter Choice: The encryption used in encrypting the pseudonyms will
not have forward secrecy since the same key κ is used all the time for encrypting
pseudonyms. We have used 34 bits (as the BVR scheme) for the next pseudonym
in the RAND instead of 4 bits per digit. This makes sense because the UE can
convert it back into the required format. Besides, using less amount of bits for
pseudonym encoding leaves room for the length of the salt, denoted by l, to be
longer. If the cipher used for encrypting u = (p′′, SQN, salt) has the block length
128, then embedding the same p′′ in the successive RANDs can be randomized
by the 48-bit long SQN and a 46-bit long salt. As the same p′′ might be sent in
multiple RANDs, the cipher used for encrypting u to generate RAND should
be immune against related plaintext attack [7]. AES is used in UMTS and LTE
network for the implementation of authentication function and immune against
related plaintext attack. Hence, it would be enough to use AES for encrypting
pseudonym also [7].
7 Conclusion
The need to maintain a synchronized state between the UE and the home net-
works is one of the key issues in the design and implementation of pseudonym-
based enhancements of user identity privacy in mobile networks. In this paper
we have proposed a relatively simple design for a layer of pseudonyms between
UE and home network that can withstand de-synchronization attacks. This gives
hope that pseudonym-based solutions can be applied in commercial cellular net-
works. Topics for future work include formal verification of our scheme, and its
implementation and testing using real UEs and mobile network elements.
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Appendix A
Let us consider that there areM number of bins, each labeled with a pseudonym
or IMSI. Choosing m random pseudonyms with replacement and sending them
in an attach request can be compared with the classic experiment of throwing m
balls toM bins. The number of affected users by sending m attach requests is
the same as the number of bins that get two or more balls after throwing m balls
toM bins. The probability that a particular bin gets no balls is (1− 1M)m. The
probability that this bin gets exactly one ball is
(
m
1
)
1
M
(
1− 1M
)m. Consequently,
the probability that the bin will get two or more balls is:
Pr[2 or more balls in a fixed bin] = 1−
(
1− 1M
)m
−
(
m
1
)
1
M
(
1− 1M
)m
If n is the number of users in the HN, then by linearity of expectation, the
expected number of affected user would be:
E[#bins with more than 1 balls] = n
(
1−
(
1− 1M
)m
−m 1M
(
1− 1M
)m)
Consequently, the expected portion of affected user would be:
E[ua] = 1−
(
1− 1M
)m
−m 1M
(
1− 1M
)m
Appendix B
In the without replacement attack, the attacker sends all the pseudonyms incre-
mentally starting from 0 across the whole MSIN space. Let us consider that the
pseudonym x is the first attack on a user’s p′. Once the user’s p′ is attacked, HN
updates p← p′ and choose a new unused p′ randomly. If the attacker sends total
m number of pseudonyms to the HN, then the probability that the user’s new
p′ will once again be attacked is: m−xM . If n is the total number of subscribers in
the HN and m ≤M (first round) then expected number of subscribers affected
after sending m pseudonyms is:
n
M
∫ m
0
m− x
M dx =
n
M2
∫ m
0
(m− x) dx
=
nm
M2
∫ m
0
dx− nM2
∫ m
0
xdx
=
nm2
M2 −
nm2
2M2
=
nm2
2M2
Consequently, the expected portion of affected users would be m
2
2M2 where m ≤M.
Let us now consider the case where M < m ≤ 2M (second round). The
attacker again sends all the pseudonyms incrementally starting from 0. Choosing
a pseudonym x will affect a user (who has not yet been affected) only if x is
the pseudonym of a user who was attacked only once in the first round. The
probability of that event is: 1 − xM . So, after sending m =M +m′ number of
pseudonyms, the expected number of affected user would be:
nM2
2M2 +
n
M
∫ m′
0
(
1− xM
)
dx
=
n
2
+
n
M2
∫ m′
0
Mdx− nM2
∫ m′
0
xdx
=
n
2
+
n (m−M)
M −
n
M2
(m−M)2
2
(since m =M+m′)
=
n
M
(
2m−M− m
2
2M
)
Consequently, the expected portion of affected users would be 1M
(
2m−M− m22M
)
whereM < m ≤ 2M.
Even though x in the above derivation is a discrete variable, we have used
integration. So, the result we have found here is an approximation since M is
large. We expect it to be a good approximation.
